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I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held, in Loving
v. Virginia,' that states were precluded from prohibiting an individual from2 3
marrying someone of a different race. In Baehr v. Lewin, a plurality of the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the Hawaii same-sex marriage ban
implicated equal protection guarantees, remanding the case to give the state
an opportunity to establish that it had a compelling interest in maintaining
such a ban.4 Commentators have criticized Baehr, claiming that: 1) the
plurality's reliance on Loving was misplaced because that case allegedly had
no bearing on the issue before the court; and 2) the plurality's reasoning
would suggest that the state was precluded from enacting any marital
restrictions, for example, prohibitions on incestuous or polygamous
marriages. 5 Yet, a consideration of several cases in which interracial
* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.A., Harvard College; M.A.,
Ph.D., University of Chicago; J.D., Stanford Law School.
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id. at 12.
3. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993).
4. Id. at68.
5. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-Orientation: Transgendered People and
Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 219 (1998); David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the
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marriage bans have been challenged helps to illustrate why cases involving
such challenges are much more relevant than commentators are willing to
admit, and why a state's being required to recognize same-sex marriages
would not entail that incestuous or polygamous marriages would also have to
be recognized.
Part II of this article discusses some of the various respects in which
Loving and Baehr are in fact analogous, commentators' claims to the
contrary notwithstanding. Part mH discusses the rhetorical claim that
recognition of same-sex marriages would entail that no marital prohibitions
are constitutionally permissible, concluding that this involves a
misunderstanding of the relevant law and is only a repetition of the kinds of
false claims that were made when theorists argued that interracial marriages
should not be recognized. The cases involving interracial marriage are
important to consider because they illustrate both how marital laws can
invidiously discriminate to deny people their fundamental rights and how
existing marital laws can be struck down without thereby establishing that no
marital restrictions are constitutionally permissible.
I1. THE LOVING ANALOGY
In Loving v. Virginia,6 the United States Supreme Court struck down
Virginia's ban on interracial marriage because it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Realizing that
Loving might carry great "rhetorical punch" in the same-sex marriage debate,
commentators discuss respects in which the statutory scheme in Loving was
different from the statutory scheme in Baehr.8 Yet, many of the differences
trumpeted by commentators are legally irrelevant, and those differences that
are legally relevant are often misrepresented either in how or in why they are
important. These exaggerations and misrepresentations only serve to
underscore the strength of the Loving analogy. While there of course are
differences between the Loving and Baehr cases, those differences are much
less legally significant than commentators are willing to admit.
Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201
(1998).
6. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. Id. at 12.
8. See Coolidge, supra note 5.
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A. Making Marriage a Crime
Commentators rightly point out that Loving involved a criminal
conviction, while Baehr did not.9 Thus, at issue in Loving was not only the
refusal of the State of Virginia to recognize the marriage of Mildred Jeter
and Richard Loving,10 but also the state's having convicted each of them of
attempting to marry a partner of a different race. In contrast, in Baehr, the
plaintiffs had sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Hawaii
statute, but had neither been charged with nor convicted of having
committed any crime.
1 2
Surprisingly, commentators fail to explain why that difference is im-
portant and why it should have any role in determining whether Loving casts
any light on the issues implicated in the same-sex marriage debate. Yet, to
point to differences without explaining how or even whether they are
important 3 is to offer rhetoric rather than legal argument. 4 Indeed, when
the claim is that cases are analogous rather than identical, it is of course
possible to identify differences between the cases and, thus, the essential part
of the analy'sis is in explaining why the identified differences are legally
significant. When this essential element is left undone, no headway can be
9. See id. at 219; see also Lynne Marie Kohm, Liberty And Marriage-Baehr and
Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12 BYU . PUn. L. 253, 254 (1998) (pointing out that the
Lovings had been convicted of a crime).
10. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (discussing the statutory scheme which "automatically voids
all marriages between 'a white person and a colored person' without any judicial proceeding")
(citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1960)).
11. See id. at 4 n.3.
12. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49 (plaintiffs were seeking a declaration of
unconstitutionality and an injunction prohibiting the future withholding of marriage licenses
on that sole basis).
13. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 220 (discussing "important differences between
Loving and Baehr' without explaining how many of those differences are legally significant).
14. Ironically, some commentators fail to explain the legal significance of their points
and, at the same time, claim that their opponents are failing to offer legal argumentation. See
generally id. at 201-04 (stating that those advocating 'same-sex marriage' are not making a
legal argument).
15. It is for this reason, among others, that much of the natural law debate about
same-sex marriage is disappointing. Not only do theorists like Professors Finnis, George,
Bradley, and others offer arguments which are internally inconsistent, but many of these
commentators seem to ignore that these discussions have very little to do with the laws that
states actually have enacted. See generally Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex
Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 51 (1998); Mark Strasser, Marital Acts, Morality, and the
Right to Privacy, 30 N.M. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999). Other commentators also do not seem
to appreciate that the discussions of natural law should be made in light of existing laws and
200]
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made in determining whether one case casts light on how another case
should be decided.
Consider what the argument focusing on the fact of criminal conviction
in one case and not the other might look like and how it might be supported.
Commentators might suggest that the fatal weakness in Loving was that Ms.
Jeter and Mr. Loving had been charged with and convicted of having
attempted to marry each other when the law had precluded their marrying.
However, if this argument is to have import for the discussion at issue, these
commentators must argue that the conviction was the fatal weakness rather
than a fatal weakness. Otherwise, for example, the fact that Virginia
unconstitutionally limited the right to marry and in addition
unconstitutionally criminalized the attempt to marry someone of a different
race would hardly undermine a claim that a different state's limitation on the
right to marry was unconstitutional, even if that latter state did not, in
addition, criminalize the attempt. Thus, those pointing out that Loving
involved a conviction and Baehr did not, are implicitly suggesting that the
fact of criminalization is somehow essential and that Virginia's laws may not
have been held unconstitutional if only the state had not criminalized the
attempt to marry. Were that an accurate description of the law,
commentators might claim with plausibility that Hawaii's refusal to permit
same-sex marriages was constitutionally permissible, given that the state did
not also criminalize the attempt to marry. However, that is a
misinterpretation of the relevant case law and thus cannot be used to support
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.
To understand why, it is be helpful to consider the arguments that may
be offered to support the claim that Loving's fatal weakness involved the
convictions. Commentators may claim to find implicit support for that
interpretation when examining two cases involving Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statutes. In Naim v. Naim,16 the Supreme Court refused to
hear a challenge to Virginia's holding that an interracial marriage was void
because, the Court suggested, the case was "devoid of a properly presented
federal question."' 7 In Naim, no criminal charges had been filed and the
only issue was whether the court below had erred when holding that the
interracial marriage at issue was void.18 However, in Loving, where a
policies if indeed we are discussing whether the state should recognize same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Forum: Sexual Morality and the Possibility of "Same-Sex
Marriage" Is Marriage Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 AM J. JURIS 51 (1997). Professor
Koppelman spends remarkably little time discussing why these natural law arguments
(regardless of their internal benefits and drawbacks) have anything to do with existing laws
and policies. Id.
16. 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
17. Id. at 985.
18. Id.; see Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749,750 (Va. 1955).
[Vol. 24:769
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conviction was at issue, the Court heard the case and invalidated the
statutory scheme that had not been disturbed in Naim.19 It might be thought
that the distinguishing feature of the two cases is that a criminal conviction
was involved in one and not the other, and that it was this feature that
mandated the result in Loving.
Support for such a view might be found in Justice Stewart's Loving
concurrence where he emphasized that the Constitution prohibits making the
criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor.20 Thus, were one
only to consider the Court's claim in Naim that no federal question had been
presented by the state's refusal to recognize an interracial marriage, 2' the
fact that there was a federal issue presented in Loving, and Justice Stewart's
concurrence, one might conclude that the Lovings' having been convicted
was legally significant. However, there are fatal weaknesses in such an
interpretation, since it neither accounts for the Loving opinion itself nor for
the Court's subsequent right to marry jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice
Stewart's having only concurred in the judgment is a strong signal that the
above interpretation simply misrepresents the propositions for which Loving
stands.
Justice Stewart's Loving concurrence is better understood in light of his
concurrence in McLaughlin v. Florida.22 At issue in McLaughlin was
Florida's making interracial fornication and adultery a separate crime which
was to be more severely punished than intra-racial fornication and adultery.
23
The Court struck down Florida's statutory scheme.24 In his concurrence,
Justice Stewart made clear that "it is simply not possible for a state law to be
valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act depend
upon the race of the actor."' 5
The State of Florida had argued that its criminal statute bolstered its
anti-miscegenation statute, that its interracial marriage ban was "immune
from attack under the Equal Protection Clause," and that the state's
interracial cohabitation law was "ancillary to and serve[d] the same purpose
as the miscegenation law itself."'  Basically, the State of Florida argued that
it prohibited interracial marriage, that the state's prohibition of such unions
19. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
20. Id. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
21. The Court's actual claim had been that no federal question had properly been
presented, perhaps leaving room for an eventual challenge, although that possibility will not
be explored here.
22. 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 185 n.1 (specifying different crimes and penalties).
24. Id. at 196.
25. Id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 195.
2000]
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was clearly constitutional, and that the state's prohibiting non-marital
interracial sexual relations served the same purposes as did the state's
prohibiting such marriages.27
The United States Supreme Court rejected Florida's argument, although
in doing so, the Court neither said that states were precluded from
prohibiting interracial marriages nor that states were precluded from using
criminal statutes to bolster their marriage laws.29 The Court instead took a
different tack, suggesting that the state's goals could be as well served by
other existing laws. 30 The Court pointed out that other statutory provisions
"which are neutral as to race express a general and strong state policy
against promiscuous conduct, whether engaged in by those who are married,
those who may marry or those who may not," and that the existing statutes,
"if enforced, would reach illicit relations of any kind and in this way protect
the integrity of the marriage laws of the State, including what is claimed to
be a valid ban on interracial marriage."31 Thus, the Court suggested that
Florida could serve its goals of deterring interracial marriages, assuming for
the sake of argument that such a goal was legitimate,32 by enforcing its
"neutral" statutes prohibiting non-marital relations and its marriage laws,
making it impossible for interracial couples to have marital relations.3 The
McLaughlin Court struck down the statute at issue because the state had
failed to establish that the statute was "a necessary adjunct to the State's ban
on interracial marriage," given the existing laws which might have been used
to deter the non-marital conduct.
34
The McLaughlin Court's ruling made it clear that Florida would be able
to punish interracial couples who had married and then had sexual relations,
since the state's anti-miscegenation law35 would make the marriage null and
of no legal effect, and the sexual relations might then be treated as either
fornication or as lewd and lascivious behavior. Further, on at least one
27. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 195.
28. See id. at 196. The Court expressly refused to express "any views about the
State's prohibition of interracial marriage." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
32. See id. at 195 (noting hypothetically that "even if we posit the constitutionality of
the ban against the marriage of a Negro and a white..
33. Id.
34. Id. at 196.
35. Ch. 59, § 13, 1832 Fla. laws 374,376, repealed by, ch. 69-195, § 1, 1969 Fla. Laws
770,771.
36. See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 185 n.1 for a specification of the elements of each
crime.
[Vol. 24:769
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reading of McLaughlin, Florida could have adopted a different tack to
achieve its goals without offending constitutional guarantees.
Suppose that Florida had feared that its existing punishments of
fornication and adultery were not sufficiently severe to deter individuals
from having interracial sexual relations. Presumably, this was at least one of
the reasons that the state had made such relations a separate crime subject to
a more severe penalty. Suppose further that the state had expanded the range
of possible punishments for committing fornication or adultery to include the
possible penalties that might have been imposed under the statute
criminalizing interracial relations at issue in McLaughlin.3 7 By taking the
above steps, the state would have been able to impose the same penalties as
it did under the statutory scheme found unconstitutional in McLaughlin and,
according to one formulation of Justice Stewart's view, might nonetheless
not have violated the Constitution.
Bracketing Justice Stewart's comments for a moment, the statutory
scheme described above would have been much more difficult to challenge
than the one at issue in McLaughlin, since this amended scheme would not
have involved facial discrimination. Certainly, if under that modified
scheme the only individuals charged with and convicted of these crimes
were married to someone of another race, then the Court might have held
that equal protection guarantees had been violated because the law had been
"applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights.
38
However, because the imposition of particular penalties might seem so
fact-dependent and because many types of couples might be convicted of
such crimes, it would be harder to establish that there had been selective
prosecution if the state was less blatant with respect to its prosecution
choices. Even if, for example, it could be established that interracial couples
were receiving more severe penalties than were intra-racial couples for
having committed adultery or fornication, the Court might turn a blind eye to
such evidence.39 In any event, Justice Stewart's articulated worry that the
criminality of the act cannot depend upon the race of the actor would not be
at issue in this modified statutory scheme, since adultery, fornication, and
lewd and lascivious behavior would all be prohibited regardless of the races
of the parties. If his sole constitutional worry was that the criminal statute
explicitly incorporated race, then the same invidious results might have been
achieved more subtly without implicating his constitutional concerns.
37. See id. (discussing the penalties).
38. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,373-74 (1886).
39. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315 (1987) (stating "[thus, if we accepted
McCleskey's claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision,
we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty") (footnote omitted).
2000]
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It is, of course, not suggested that Florida should have adopted the
above scheme but merely that Justice Stewart's stated objection would be
easy for a state to avoid, while both preventing interracial marriage and
punishing those who attempted to contract such marriages. Yet, the Loving
opinion precluded far more than did Justice Stewart's concurrence. Not only
does the opinion preclude a state's explicitly criminalizing the attempt to
marry someone of a different race, but it also precludes a state's barring
interracial couples from marrying.4 4 Thus, while both McLaughlin and
Loving struck down criminal statutes,41 Loving did far more than that, since
it also invalidated the laws barring interracial marriage then existing in
several states.42
The Loving Court offered two bases upon which the Virginia anti-
miscegenation law would have been struck down even had there not in
addition been statutes criminalizing the attempt to marry someone of a
different race.43 The Court wrote that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men," suggesting that the state's denial of the Lovings'
right to marry violated due process guarantees 44 and that "restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.,
45
Arguably, the proper interpretation of Loving can only be established
upon an examination of subsequent decisions concerning the right to marry
generally or, perhaps, the Loving decision specifically. Yet, the subsequent
case law also establishes that Loving was about more than merely preventing
states from criminalizing the attempt to marry a partner of a different race,
since in subsequent case law Loving stands for the proposition that "the right
to marry is of fundamental importance." 46 Thus, while it is true that Loving
involved criminal convictions and Baehr did not, and it is of course true that
a year's imprisonment is not to be treated lightly,47 it is simply wrong to
40. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
41. See Robert A. Destro, Symposium, Law & the Politics of Marriage: Loving v.
Virginia After 30 Years, Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1207, 1213 (1998) (pointing out
that both cases involved criminal statutes).
42. See id. at 1207-08 (suggesting that several states had anti-miscegenation laws).
43. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
44. Id. (stating that "[t]hese statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
45. Id.
46. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right to marry") (citing
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978)
(stating that "[t]he leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia").
47. The Lovings were sentenced to one year in jail. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. The
776 [Vol. 24:769
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suggest that the fatal weakness of the Virginia statutory framework was that
criminal penalties were involved. If Virginia had merely refused to
recognize the Lovings' relationship, 48 the state's law would still have been
unconstitutional.49 Thus, while it is true that criminal penalties were at issue
in Loving but not in Baehr, that has nothing to do with whether Loving is
instructive with respect to how Baehr should be decided.
Ironically, had the difficulty presented by Loving been that there is
something wrong with using criminal statutes to buttress the marriage laws,
this would have had implications for other state statutes. Consider state
statutes that preclude marriages between individuals closely related by blood
and that also criminalize the violation of those incest statutes.50 Were states
precluded from passing criminal laws to bolster their marriage statutes, then
it would seem that those laws would be unconstitutional. The point here, of
course, is neither that incest and anti-miscegenation laws are analogous 51 nor
that the Constitution precludes states from using criminal statutes to bolster
their marriage laws, but merely that a blanket rule suggesting that criminal
laws could not be used to bolster such laws would have wider implications
than originally thought.
sentences were suspended for a period of 25 years on the condition that they leave the state
and not return together during that time. Id.
48. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 256-57 (suggesting that an important distinction was
that in Loving, state proceedings were instituted against the couple, whereas in Baehr, the
state had merely refused to "sanction certain relationships"); see also Coolidge, supra note 5,
at 219 (distinguishing between Loving and Baehr by suggesting that in Hawaii "the marriage
law is positive, not prohibitory"). Professor Coolidge implies that nothing was amiss in the
Hawaii case because "[i]n Hawaii, no one was charged with a felony; the State simply sent
them a polite letter and returned their marriage applications." Coolidge, supra note 5, at 219.
49. Ironically, Professor Kohm recognizes that Loving is about the right to marry
rather than about the right to have state proceedings instituted against one when one does
marry. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 254 (noting that the Loving Court held that "liberty and
freedom to marry is indeed a fundamental right"). She nonetheless distinguishes between
Baehr and Loving by discussing whether proceedings had been instituted against the couple.
See id.
50. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-13-3(a), (c) (1975) (specifying the family members
whom individuals cannot marry and the kind of felony that would be committed for attempting
to contract such a marriage); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106 (a), (b) (Michie 1987) (specifying
which marriages would violate the incest prohibition and specifying the criminal penalty for
attempting to contract such a marriage); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.020 (West 1999) (specifying
the marriages that would violate incest prohibition and the type of felony involved in the
attempt to contract that marriage).
51. For a discussion of the historical claim that they were analogous, see infra notes
125-28 and accompanying text.
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B. On Using the Courts to Vindicate Rights
Some commentators imply that there is something illicit in using the
courts to vindicate one's right to marry, suggesting that those who want the
right to marry a same-sex partner should try to convince their legislators that
the marriage laws should be changed rather than thwart the democratic
process by making use of the courts. Thus, these commentators imply that
would-be married same-sex couples who are currently unable to convince
the legislature of the wisdom of recognizing same-sex marriage should
simply keep trying until they ultimately are successful or, perhaps, until they
are no longer interested in marrying.5 These commentators fail to mention
that the same argument might be offered in all of the cases challenging
marital regulations and is no more correct in this context than it was in those.
Ironically, those who claim that Loving and Baehr are so different fail
to mention that this is a respect in which the cases may be thought to be
analogous. Thus, it could be argued that the Lovings were trying to
circumvent the democratic process by using the courts to have their marriage
validated. Indeed, one of the arguments offered by the State of Virginia was
that the "Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature." 54 The
United States Supreme Court wisely rejected the invitation to do so,
notwithstanding the view offered by the Supreme Court of Virginia that
striking down an anti-miscegenation law "would be judicial legislation in the
52. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 235 (complaining that same-sex marriage
proponents want "to use Loving to remove the current debate about marriage from the
democratic process"); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to
Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 739-40
(1998) (implying that there is something illicit in having the courts recognize same-sex
marriage because they are not "politically accountable to the people"); and Lynn D. Wardle, A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 5
(1996) ("[clonstitutionalizing same-sex marriage raises serious concerns about the delicate
balance of federalism, about judicial overreaching, and about principles of representative
government, in addition to concerns about the revolutionary effects of same-sex marriage").
Cf Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of
Marriage Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1239 (1998) (complaining that if the Hawaii
Supreme Court were to uphold the trial court's having found that the state same-sex marriage
ban was unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds, the court might thereby "foreclose an
important public debate").
53. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex
Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 57 (1996) (suggesting that such marriages should not be
recognized because a majority of Americans have not been persuaded that such unions should
be legalized).
54. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
[Vol. 24:769
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rawest sense of that term. 5  The Court further rejected the view that the
arguments against such marriage bans "are properly addressable to the
legislature, which enacted the law in the first place, and not to this court,
whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to
adjudicate, and not to legislate. 56
The United States Supreme Court decided that it was appropriate for
the judiciary to examine the statutory scheme at issue in Loving, given the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake.57 The Court made clear that the
"freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
women]. '' 8 Furthermore, this freedom was simply too important to be
withheld until the legislature could be convinced to change the anti-
miscegenation law.
59
Zablocki v. Redhaile involved a challenge to a Wisconsin statute
precluding noncustodial parents from marrying under certain conditions.
61
One infers that these commentators would suggest that Mr. Redhail should
not have tried to vindicate his right to marry his pregnant financee through
the courts, but instead should simply have spoken to the members of the
legislature.62 After all, to make use of the courts to establish one's right to
marry is to suggest that "citizens [are] too dangerous to be trusted
with... judgments about the common good. ' 63
At least one of the difficulties with these commentators' position is that
it undervalues the importance of the right at issue. As the Loving Court
suggested, challenges to marriage regulations should not be viewed as if they,
were cases involving mere economic regulation in which "the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the
discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures."' 64
The Loving Court described marriage as involving a "fundamental
55. Loving v. Virgina, 147 S.E.2d 78,82 (Va. 1966).
56. Id.
57. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (stating "[t]o deny this fundamental freedom on so
unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law").
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 374-75.
62. See id. at 379 (appellee and the woman he desired to marry were expecting a child
in March of 1975 and wished to be lawfully married before that time).
63. Coolidge, supra note 5, at 236.
64. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9.
2000]
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freedom' '65 and, as the Zablocki Court subsequently made clear, "the right to
marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals."66 Were individuals
precluded from making use of the courts to vindicate their marriage rights,
one of the checks built into our legal system would be destroyed, namely,
making sure that when a statutory classification "interfere[s] directly and
substantially with the right to marry," 67 the classification will not be upheld
"unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.
68
It is, at the very least, surprising and disappointing that commentators
would suggest that it is somehow hypocritical to vindicate one's right to
69equal treatment through the courts. In a country in which the electorate of
one state recently tried to amend their state constitution to include a
provision adversely affecting lesbians, gays, and bisexuals "not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,, 70 it is
nothing short of amazing that commentators would nonetheless suggest that
members of that group who make use of the courts to protect their rights are
somehow doing something hypocritical and inappropriate.
C. Classifications Based on Race and Sex
Commentators make a variety of disingenuous arguments when
comparing Loving and Baehr. Nonetheless, it is not argued here that there
are no important differences between the two cases. On the contrary,
differences do exist, although they tend to be represented by commentators
in a way that obscures rather than clarifies the issues. For example, Loving
involves a classification based on race,72 whereas Baehr involves a
classification based on sex.73 That difference is not necessarily important-
in some states, sex-based classifications are subjected to the same degree of
65. Id. at 12.
66. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
67. Id. at 386-87.
68. Id. at 388.
69. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 236 (noting "[t]he plaintiffs claim that their goal is
to be treated as equal citizens, yet their attorneys want to withdraw the resolution of the
question from their fellow citizens").
70. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
71. See, e.g., supra notes 9-51 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
whether a conviction is a issue, given that Loving precludes anti-miscegenation statutes even
if there are no criminal statutes to bolster that law); supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the claim that same-sex couples circumvent the political process when the same
claim might have been made in Loving and other cases).
72. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
73. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49.
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scrutiny as are race-based classifications because of state constitutional
protections. 74 However, the United States Constitution imposes a lower
level of scrutiny on statutes incorporating sex-based classifications than it
does on statutes incorporating race-based classifications. Thus, a statute
incorporating the former might pass constitutional muster, even if an
analogous statute incorporating the latter would not.75 However, even the
above difference is often characterized in a misleading, if not simply
inaccurate, way.
Consider the claim that same-sex marriage bans classify on the basis of
sex because the sexes of the respective parties is what precludes them from
marrying-a man may marry a woman, but not a man; and a woman may
marry a man, but not a wonan.7 6 A separate question is whether the state
interest in classifying on the basis of sex is sufficiently important for such a
classification to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Thus, it is one thing to
say that a statute classifies on the basis of sex and a different one to say that
a statute invidiously discriminates on the basis of sex, but it should not be
difficult to understand how a statute which says that a marriage may only be
between a man and a woman" at the very least does the former.
Nonetheless, some commentators reject that contention. For example,
Professor Duncan suggests that "[d]ual-gender marriage laws do not classify
on the basis of gender," since they "merely define marriage as a relationship
between one man and one woman and apply the same neutral rules to both
men and women."78 He suggests that "[p]roperly understood, the same-sex
marriage issue is about an eminently reasonable distinction drawn on the
basis of sexual orientation."
79
74. See id. at 67 (holding that the state constitution requires that sex-based
classifications, like race-based classifications, be subjected to strict scrutiny).
75. See Kohm, supra note 9, at 260-61 (stating "[tihe central problem in making the
Loving analogy to same-sex marriage petitions is that race is afforded the strictest scrutiny for
constitutional protection, while gender or sex is not and has never been afforded the strictest
scrutiny under the federal constitution"); see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 83 ("[i]n terms of
the history, purpose, and application of the Fourteenth Amendment, race and gender are not
fungible categories because race triggers the strictest standard of judicial scrutiny, whereas
gender discrimination invokes an intermediate, albeit heightened, standard of judicial
review").
76. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60; see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 83 (describing the
argument that "since conventional marriage laws allow a man, for example, to marry a woman
but not a man, they discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause"). Professor Wardle does not subscribe to that argument. See Wardle, supra note 53,
at 83 (describing the argument as "flawed").
77. See HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (Supp. 1998).
78. Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer. Homosexual Marriage and Moral
Discernment, 12 BYU . PUB. L. 239, 243 (1998).
79. Id.
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Professor Duncan's view seems to conflate the two questions that the
Baehr plurality was keeping separate: 1) whether the classification was sex-
based; and 2) whether the sex-based classification was legitimate8s
Surprisingly, he realizes that the classification focuses on whether the parties
who wish to marry are of the same-sex--dual-gender laws are at issue.
81
However, because the classification is allegedly reasonable, the nature of the
classification itself somehow changes from being sex-based to being
orientation-based instead.82 Yet, whether a classification is sex-based rather
than orientation-based has nothing to do with whether the classification is
wise or even constitutional, and thus the implicit suggestion that the
reasonableness of the classification determines its nature is simply mistaken.
Suppose that two heterosexuals wished to marry because they wished to
secure particular government benefits that they might not otherwise be able
to secure.83 The question for Professor Duncan would be whether these
individuals could marry. If not, for example, because the statute expressly
states that only a man may marry a woman and only a woman may marry a
man, then it seems clear that the statute is sex rather than orientation-based.
Further, if that couple could marry, notwithstanding the explicit textual
requirement that they be of different sexes, then a different problem would
be presented-a statute allegedly "fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, because it would "prohibit same sex marriages on the part of
professed 85 or nonprofessed heterosexuals, homosexuals, bisexuals, or
asexuals," would nonetheless have been "applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to
make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights. 86
Consider a different example. Suppose that a gay man and a lesbian
wished to marry each other, perhaps as a way of securing government
benefits. The dual-gender law would not preclude their marrying,
notwithstanding their having the 'wrong' sexual orientation and
80. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (pointing out that the dissent has misunderstood the
opinion, since the plurality has merely said that the statute involves a sex-based classification
and is remanding the case for a determination of whether that classification is invidious).
81. See Duncan, supra note 78.
82. See id.
83. See Sondrea Joy King, Note, Ya'll Can't Do That Here: Will Texas Recognize
Same-Sex Marriages Validly Contracted in Other States?, 2 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 515, 551
(1996) (posing a hypothetical of two heterosexual women who wish to marry for economic
benefits).
84. YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
85. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
86. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
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notwithstanding the allegedly "eminently reasonable distinction drawn on
the basis of sexual orientation." °
Two issues should not be conflated: 1) the nature of the classification;
and 2) the purpose behind the statute. The purpose behind the adoption of a
sex-based classification may be to disadvantage individuals with a particular
sexual orientation. In that event, the constitutional issue requiring analysis
would be whether it is acceptable to employ a sex-based classification to
achieve the allegedly important goal of, for example, establishing or
reinforcing the societal view that heterosexuals are superior to lesbians,
gays, and bisexuals.88 While many would argue that this is exactly the sort
of societal goal that Romer suggests is illegitimate,89 Professor Duncan
seems to disagree.
90
To determine whether the sex-based classification implicated in dual-
gender statutes promotes sufficiently important goals, the asserted state
interests must be subjected to judicial scrutiny. However, as the Supreme
Court made clear in United States v. Virginia,91 "[plarties who seek to
defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly
persuasive justification' for that action."92  Thus, even though heightened
scrutiny is not as stringent as strict scrutiny, it should not be thought that it
involves a standard that is easy to meet.
Commentators deny that the sex-based classification implicated in
same-sex marriage bans involves an invidious distinction.93 After all, the
87. Duncan, supra note 78, at 243.
88. See id. at 239-40. (discussing the "radical and dangerous agenda' which seeks to
"reflect the alleged equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality").
89. See Matthew Coles, The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343,
1361 (1997) (noting "[t]o the Court, sexual orientation discrimination is the moral (if not the
legal) equivalent of race and sex discrimination"); Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal
Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 454
(1997) (stating that "[i]n striking down Colorado's Amendment 2 for seeking to impose
second-class status on gays and lesbians, the Supreme Court illuminated the core of equal
protection: government must respect the principle that all persons have equal intrinsic worth").
90. See Duncan, supra note 78, at 246 (claiming that Romer did not "hold that laws
that make distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation or relationships are tainted by animus
or dislike for a politically unpopular group," and that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional
"only because no legitimate state interest came close to fitting the Amendment's nearly
infinite path of disadvantage").
91. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
92. Id. at 531 (citations omitted).
93. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 208 (suggesting that the distinction is not
invidious); see also Wardle, supra note 53, at 62 (arguing that "laws permitting only
heterosexual marriage could survive strict judicial scrutiny").
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statutes treat men and women in precisely the same way,94 since each is
precluded from marrying someone of the same sex. 95 Yet, that alone will not
suffice to establish the permissibility of the statute, since the Court has
already made clear that "[e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved
through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities,, 96 and, in fact, the Court
rejected the analogous argument in Loving.97 Thus, the State of Virginia
argued that while its anti-miscegenation statutes employed racial
classifications, the "reliance on racial classifications, [did] not constitute an
invidious discrimination based upon race" because they applied equally to
whites and blacks.98 Because the classification (allegedly) was not
invidious, the state claimed that "the question of constitutionality... [was]
whether there was any rational basis for a state to treat interracial marriages
differently from other marriages." 99 However, the Court rejected "the notion
that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing racial classifications
is enough to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's
proscription of all invidious racial discriminations." °
One way to understand the difference between the views expressed by
the Court and the State of Virginia in Loving helps illuminate one of the
points of disagreement between the plurality and the dissent in Baehr.
Basically, the State of Virginia had argued that because the classification
was not invidious, the Court should defer to the legislature. °1 The Court
rejected that analysis because of the type of classification at issue. 10
Consider the disagreement between the plurality and the dissent in
Baehr. The Baehr plurality determined that the statute incorporated a sex-
based classification and then remanded the case for a determination of
whether the classification was invidious.1°3 Judge Heen, in dissent, decided
94. Blair, supra note 52, at 1238 (arguing that "[s]ex discrimination simply does not
enter into Hawaii's marriage law: women and men are treated precisely the same").
95. See Jay Alan Sekulow & John Tuskey, Sex and Sodomy and Apples and
Oranges-Does the Constitution Require States to Grant a Right to Do the Impossible? 12
BYU J. PuB. L. 309, 323 (1998) (stating that "[t]he obvious rejoinder to this argument is that
state marriage laws treat men and women alike: Billy may no more marry Bobby than Sue
may marry Linda. Thus, these laws discriminate against neither men nor women.").
96. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
97. Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 163, 163 (1999) (noting that "Loving involved a law that was in fact
neutral as between black and white persons who married interracially-punishing them
equally for miscegenation").
98. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
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that the classification was not invidious and thus saw no reason to remand
the case for an examination of the state's asserted interests.104 Judge Heen
was determining whether heightened scrutiny was appropriate in light of
whether he believed the classification invidious instead of imposing
heightened scrutiny to determine whether an invidious distinction had been
made.105 Yet, as the Baehr plurality recognized, the relevant jurisprudence
requires that when a statute incorporates a sex-based classification, the court
should impose heightened scrutiny to determine whether that classification is
invidious.'06 The court should not decide whether the classification is
invidious, and then decide what level of scrutiny to impose.1
7
Certainly, Judge Heen is not the first to claim that same-sex marriage
108bans do not violate equal protection guarantees. Of course, the same
might be said of the view expressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia
regarding whether interracial marriage bans violated equal protection
guarantees. 1°9 For example, about eighty years before Loving was decided,
the Supreme Court of Alabama addressed whether the Equal Protection
Clause precluded states from prohibiting interracial marriages." 0 The court
considered the state's anti-miscegenation statute, which read:
If any white person and any negro, or the descendant of any negro
to the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each
generation was a white person, intermarry, or live in adultery or
fornication, with each other, each of them must, on conviction, be
imprisoned in the penitentiary, or sentenced to hard labor for the
county for not less than two, nor more than seven years."
The court wrote:
What the law declares to be a punishable offense, is, marriage
between a white person and a negro. And it no more tolerates it in
one of the parties than the other-in a white person than in a negro
or mulatto; and each of them is punishable for the offense
prohibited, in precisely the same manner and to the same extent.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Id.106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (finding no equal
protection violation).
109. Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
110. See Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).111. Id. at 191.
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There is no discrimination made in favor of the white person, either
in the capacity to enter into such a relation, or in the penalty.
12
Basically, the court suggested that because both whites and blacks were
prohibited from intermarrying and because whites and blacks would be
subjected to the same penalties for violating the statute at issue, there was no
equal protection violation.!
13
It is not as if such reasoning would only have been offered in the 1800s.
The Supreme Court of Virginia manifested its aRproval of such reasoning in
Naim v. Naim in 1955. Pace v. Alabama was cited in Naim with
approval. 16 The Pace Court had denied that equal protection guarantees
were violated by a statute punishing interracial fornication or adultery more
severely than intra-racial fornication, suggesting, "[w]hatever discrimination
is made in the punishment prescribed ... is directed against the offence
designated and not against the person of any particular color or race. The
punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is the
same."" 7
The Supreme Court of Virginia expressed its approval of its own Naim
decision in Loving v. Virginia, Is expressly stating that it could "find no
sound judicial reason.., to depart from [its] holding in the Naim case."'"19
Further, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's claim in
McLaughlin that the "narrow view of the Equal Protection Clause
[articulated in Pace] was soon swept away,"' 120 the Court refused to hear a
case in 1954 in which Alabama's anti-miscegenation statute was at issue and
in which the court specifically cited Pace to support its upholding the
statute.'21
112. Id. at 192.
113. See id. at 197 (stating that "[n]o amendment to the Constitution, nor any
enactment thereby authorized, is in any degree infringed by the enforcement of the section of
the Code, under which the appellant in this cause was convicted and sentenced"); see also
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 405 (Ind. 1871) (noting that "[i]t is quite clear to us, that neither
the fourteenth amendment nor the civil rights bill has impaired or abrogated the laws of this
State on the subject of marriage of whites and negroes").
114. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), on remand 90 S.E.2d
849 (Va. 1956) (adhering to previous decision in 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955) (lacking a
properly presented federal question)).
115. 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
116. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 754.
117. Pace, 106 U.S. at 585.
118. 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966).
119. Id. at 82.
120. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 190.
121. See Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114, 115 (Ala. Crim. App. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 888 (1954).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia was probably as surprised by the Loving
Court's holding that the anti-miscegenation statute at issue involved
invidious discrimination, as were a variety of commentators by the Baehr
plurality's holding that Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban implicated equal
protection guarantees and hence might be invidious.12 Nonetheless,
commentators distinguish between Loving and Baehr by claiming that the
former obviously was invidious and the latter obviously is not. It was not
obvious at the time how Loving would be decided and, more importantly for
purposes here, at best premature to have decided the question in Baehr
before the state's interests had even been articulated. The point here of
course is not that Loving was wrongly decided, but that the whole point of
the remand in Baehr was to find out whether in fact the distinction was
invidious.12 To conclude that the Hawaii statute was constitutional, without
even examining whether Hawaii could identify important legitimate interests
is simply to ignore the applicable test. It simply will not do merely to assert
that such laws are permissible or, perhaps, that such legitimate state interests
exist or that the statutes are sufficiently closely tailored, since that kind of
analysis is merely rhetoric and the antithesis of legal argument.1 24
III. INCEST AND POLYGAMY
Some commentators suggest that if the Constitution precludes states
from enacting same-sex marriage bans, then the Constitution precludes states
from prohibiting any marital unions including incestuous or polygamous
ones. However, this involves a misunderstanding both of why the state
might be precluded from enacting same-sex marriage bans and of what
arguments might be made to justify particular marital restrictions.
A. The Slippery Slope Argument
A variety of commentators seem to believe that if the Constitution
requires the recognition of same-sex marriages, then it requires the
122. The plurality remanded the case to give the state an opportunity to demonstrate
that the ban "furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgements of constitutional rights." See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68.
123. See Coolidge, supra note 5, at 208 (discussing with approval Judge Heen's Baehr
dissent in which Jude Heen suggested that the Virginia law was based on invidious racial
discrimination and the Hawaii law was not based upon invidious sex discrimination).
124. For an extensive analysis of some of the legal issues surrounding same-sex
marriage, see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTrrUTION
(1997) and MARK STRASSER, THE CHAULENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTnUTONAL PROTECTIONS (1999).
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recognition of all marriages. '2 Yet, such a claim involves a variety of
misconceptions, as becomes apparent when one considers how the argument
has been used in the past.
It should not be surprising that slippery slope concerns were articulated
when the issue was whether interracial marriages should be recognized. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee suggested that if interracial marriages validly
celebrated in other states were recognized by Tennessee, "we might have in
Tennessee the father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the
brother with the sister, in lawful wedlock, because they had formed such
relations in a State or country where they were not prohibited"' 26 and,
further, that the "Turk or Mohammedan, with his numerous wives [could]
establish his harem at the doors of the capitol, and we [would be] without
remedy." 127  Thus, the court apparently believed that the recognition of
interracial marriages would dictate that incestuous or polygamous marriages
would also have to be recognized.
12
Worries of the Supreme Court of Tennessee notwithstanding, the
Constitution's requiring the recognition of interracial marriages does not
imply that all marriages must be recognized and, in fact, has not led to the
abolition of all marital restrictions. The questions at hand whenever a
marital regulation is challenged are simply whether there are sufficiently
important state interests promoted by banning the union at issue and whether
the statute is sufficiently tailored to promote those interests. Where no
important state interests are implicated or the statute at issue is not
sufficiently tailored to promote important interests, the marital prohibition
will not pass constitutional muster. Where the interests are sufficiently
important and the statute sufficiently tailored, the Constitution will not stand
in the way, even if the Constitution does provide a bar with respect to other
marital classifications.
125. See Coombs, supra note 5, at 231 (describing the claim offered by others that
recognition of same-sex marriage "sends us down a slippery slope that would also protect
incest or polygamy"); Linda C. McClain, Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus,
and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAm L. Ray. 1241, 1249 (1998) (discussing the "familiar
invocation of the slippery slope: recognizing same-sex marriage would open the door to the
recognition of all manner of relationships, including incest, polygamy, and bestiality").
126. See State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872).
127. Id.
128. Different issues are implicated when the question is whether to recognize a
marriage validly celebrated elsewhere rather than whether to allow the celebration of the
marriage locally. See generally Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent
Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 339 (1998).
However, that is not relevant for the point being made here.
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B. Equal Protection
It is especially ironic that the specter of incestuous and polygamous
unions has been raised in light of the Baehr decision. The Baehr plurality
denied that the same-sex marriage ban implicated substantive due process
guarantees. 129 According to the Baehr plurality, the reason that same-sex
marriage bans should receive heightened scrutiny is that they involve sex-
based classifications. 130  If the recognition of same-sex marriages is to
challenge marital restrictions of incestuous or polygamous relationships,
then it must be established how the recognition that same-sex marriage bans
classify on the basis of gender somehow establishes (or at least makes more
likely) a similar claim about incest or polygamy regulations. Of course, even
if such a case could be made, that would merely imply that the state's
reasons for prohibiting polygamous or incestuous marriages would have to
be examined with heightened scrutiny.l
It might be thought that polygamy restrictions implicate equal
protection guarantees on the basis of religion and, thus, should be subjected
to strict scrutiny. 32 Whether the Constitution requires the recognition of
same-sex marriages on equal protection grounds would hardly affect either
whether strict scrutiny would be imposed when polygamy restrictions were
at issue, or whether such restrictions would be struck down were such
scrutiny imposed.
Arguably, the recognition of same-sex marriages would affect whether
polygamous or incestuous unions will be permitted because the latter are no
more offensive than the former and, thus, if the former must be recognized
then the latter must be as well. However, even were that an accurate
description of public opinion, more would have to be asserted, namely, that
there should be a new criterion for whether marriages should be
recognized-the offensiveness criterion. It would not matter what legitimate
state interests were supported by a particular regulation or how closely
129. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (stating that "[a]ccordingly, we hold that the applicant
couples do not have a fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage arising out of the
right to privacy or otherwise").
130. See id. at 67.
131. For a discussion of why polygamous marriages should not be recognized, see
Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997).
132. See Keith Jaasma, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Responding to Smith;
Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 WmTrMR L. REV. 211, 257 (1995) (suggesting that restriction of
religiously motivated polygamy should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
133. See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (suggesting
that the state has a compelling interest in maintaining its ban on polygamy), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 849 (1985).
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tailored the relevant law was. The only question would be how offensive
that union was to the general populace, perhaps as determined by a Gallup
Poll. Yet, if this purports to represent current law or even what the law
should be, "the statement carries its own refutation."' 34  This is a
constitutional democracy in which the will or tastes of the majority are
subject to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution.
The offensiveness criterion has been suggested in the past. When
justifying the refusal to recognize an interracial marriage, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee described certain incestuous and polygamous relationships and
then suggested that "none of these are more revolting, more to be avoided, or
more unnatural than the case before us [an interracial marriage].' 13  That
court's analysis should sound a cautionary note, since the recognition or
adoption of an offensiveness criterion would mean that a whole host of
potential marital unions might be at risk, those involving individuals of
different races, religions, or generations might all be found too offensive
(according to the tastes of some) to be permitted.136 The right to marry is
simply too important to be left to the whims of the general populace.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some commentators suggest that Loving and Baehr are not analogous.
However, the differences they cite are often irrelevant and, even when
relevant, are often misrepresented in importance or implication. Certainly,
bans of interracial and same-sex marriages can be differentiated. The
important question is whether those distinctions are relevant to the issues at
hand and a surprising number of commentators seem to believe that such a
basic element of the analysis need not be offered when same-sex marriage is
at issue.
The history of this country's treatment of interracial marriage bans has
many important lessons, including how equal protection guarantees can be
distorted beyond recognition and how permitting states to enact marriage
regulations without having to articulate the interests thereby served can lead
to the perpetuation of invidious distinctions. Many of the arguments
currently offered in an attempt to establish that same-sex marriages should
not be recognized echo the kinds of fallacious arguments that were used in
attempts to prevent the recognition of interracial marriages. Those
134. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,443 (1934).
135. Bell, 66 Tenn. at 11.
136. A separate issue is whether marriages that were already contracted could be
invalidated. That involves a separate question which is beyond the scope of the current
discussion. For a discussion of that issue, see generally Mark Strasser, Constitutional
Limitations and Baehr Possibilities: On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations,
and Manifest Injustice, 29 RuTGERS L.J. 271 (1998).
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arguments were rightly rejected as invalid decades ago and they have not
somehow acquired validity over the intervening 
years.W t a
The constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans can only be determined
once states assert their reasons for enacting such statutes. One of the
benefits of subjecting these statutes to even heightened scrutiny is that the
state is forced to articulate the interests allegedly thereby served, and both
the importance of the interests and the methods for attaining them are then
subjected to examination. The Court has made clear that when sex-based
classifications are at issue, the "justification must be genuine, not
hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation. ' 38 Further,
those justifications "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females,"' 139 and the
differences between men and women must not be cause for "denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on [their]
opportunit[ies]."'40
If a justification is to be genuine rather than merely hypothesized, one
would expect that the asserted state interest in preventing same-sex partners
from marrying would also play a role in preventing others from marrying. If
a state interest asserted in cases involving same-sex couples, for example,
the alle ed importance of the parties' being able to procreate through their
union, plays no role in other marital regulations, then one has reason to
believe that the interest asserted is not a genuine interest of the state. Of
course, an interest can be genuine but nonetheless impermissible because not
legitimate. If, for example, the real reason for same-sex marriage bans is to
impose a stigma on lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, then the statute may well
be closely tailored to promote an illegitimate end, but is nonetheless
unconstitutional. If the reasons offered for same-sex marriage bans are
invented rather than genuine or are genuine but illegitimate, the Equal
Protection Clause will not allow these marital restrictions to stand. If the
arguments against same-sex marriage currently put forward are the best that
can be offered, then there is reason to believe that same-sex marriage bans
should be found unconstitutional and to hope that such marital unions will
soon be recognized.
137. Id.
138. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. For such an argument, see generally John Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual
Orientation," 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1049 (1994).
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